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Abstract 
 
Decrements in selective attention are a commonly experienced phenomenon that has 
practical implications for many industries. Two causes of such deficits are mental fatigue 
and alcohol intoxication, which impair selective attention by decreasing the efficiency of 
inhibitory processes. The present research examined the effects of these two factors on 
the selective attention subtest of the Useful Field of View test in both a baseline and an 
experimental session. Participants in the mental fatigue condition (n = 14) were tested 
while performing a divided attention task for two hours to induce mental fatigue. Those 
in the alcohol condition (n = 10) were tested while achieving a peak blood alcohol 
content of 0.05%. No differences between the two groups were observed, nor was a 
significant decline in selective attention observed as a result of either manipulation. The 
results indicate three possible explanations for this lack of a difference including a floor 
effect on the selective attention task, a pop-out effect in switching from the divided to the 
selective attention task, and an increase in attentional effort regulation due to the contrast 
in difficulty of the divided and selective attention tasks. 
 
 
 
vi 
 Introduction 
 Imagine driving on a straight stretch of quiet interstate with a passenger: you are 
able to carry on a conversation easily and feel that you need to watch the road minimally. 
By contrast, imagine navigating city streets during rush hour: you are now watching 
traffic vigilantly and are asking your passenger to stop talking so you can concentrate. 
How is it that these two situations, which consist of essentially the same processes, 
produce such different reactions and outcomes? It is because of the difference in demand 
of attentional resources and their allocation. More demanding tasks require that one 
allocate attention carefully in order to focus fully on the relevant aspects. A number of 
different theoretical processes have been proposed to explain how this allocation may 
occur.  
 Attention has been conceptualized many ways, but three ideas have remained 
relatively popular and have received empirical support. The first is the characterization of 
attention as a filtering process. Broadbent (1982) proposed that a person will block out, or 
filter, irrelevant information very early in the selection process and that this generally 
occurs based on sensory differences between relevant and irrelevant stimuli. However, 
data also supports the theory that filtering occurs later in the attentional process (Deutsch 
& Deutsch, 1963). One example of this is found in dichotic listening tasks, where 
participants are presented with two separate stimuli, one in each ear, and instructed to 
attend to only one of the channels. At times, participants are presented with words that 
form a coherent message in one ear and consciously attend to that message. However, if 
the message is switched to the other ear mid-sentence, participants continue to track the 
message in spite of it being in the ignored ear (Johnston & Dark, 1986). This means that 
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information is being processed and filtered on a semantic level, because sensory filtering 
would preclude participants from following the message to the unattended ear.   
 One of the practical problems with filtering is that it comes with a cost 
(Kahneman, Treisman, & Burkell, 1983). Kahneman et al. (1983) tested participants’ 
ability to detect and name words and shapes in the presence of distractors that were either 
perceptually similar or dissimilar to the target. They found that the presence of any type 
of distractor produced slower reaction times, even to automated tasks such as reading a 
word. Additionally, they determined that filtering is not an “all-or-nothing” process, but 
rather that the more distractors that are present in an environment, the more reaction time 
will be slowed. This means that each individual distractor serves to add to the amount of 
interference in a response. Overall, they concluded that any act of selection, no matter 
how simple or seemingly easy, involves filtering and will come with a cost in response 
time.  
 The second conceptualization of attention is as a central processor that has a 
limited capacity. By this view, all information that is obtained through effortful attention 
is acted upon by a single set of resources. These resources will have no difficulty 
executing a single action, but two or more tasks that require the use of the central 
processor will produce interference and delay outcomes for all of the actions (Posner & 
Boies, 1971). However, there is variability in the use of resources, in that they can be 
allotted to different tasks or to separate areas in differing degrees (Eriksen & St. James, 
1986). For example, if a display is simple enough, meaning it has few noise items to 
distract from locating the target, resources can be distributed equally, which results in a 
parallel search where participants scan all items in the display simultaneously. If the 
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display is more difficult and contains many distractor items, resources must be 
concentrated and search will proceed in a serial manner, where participants scan each 
item before moving on to the next. This leads to the final characterization of attention, 
which is that it is similar to a spotlight or a zoom lens. 
 The model of attention as a spotlight is a capacity model that suggests that 
resources can either be distributed over a field or focused in one spatial field. Because 
there is a functional limit on the available resources, the greater the area over which they 
are distributed the more thinly they will be spread. This results in the ability to respond to 
a stimulus in a large field, but a slower response time because fewer resources are allotted 
to each object. On the other hand, if the area is very small all the resources can be 
concentrated, allowing a person to respond to just one area or stimulus in a field but also 
to do so very quickly (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). One problem with the 
spotlight model is that it does not specify whether attention is either focused or 
distributed, at the two extremes, or if it can be distributed unequally. Unequal distribution 
implies that the attentional spotlight may simultaneously be focused on multiple areas or 
focused on one area while it is distributed across the rest of the visual field. Eriksen and 
St. James (1986) contended that instead of lying at either extreme, attention is actually on 
a continuum from focused to distributed. They explained that this zoom lens model is 
similar to the spotlight theory in that a wider field results in a greater area within one’s 
frame but less information extracted from each item, and a smaller, “zoomed-in” field 
results in a small frame but allows for maximal information extraction. The difference is 
that the zoom lens model envisions a scale between these two points where there 
continues to be a relatively equal trade-off between field size and the amount of 
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information obtained. These two models have received much empirical support and have 
increased our understanding of the distribution of visual attention (Podgorny & Shepard, 
1983), signal detection (Posner et al., 1980), and the shape of visual attention (Eriksen & 
St. James, 1986).  
 While the above discussion pertains to attention in general, there are actually 
three types of attention: focused, divided, and selective. Posner et al. (1980) aptly said of 
focused attention that “Detecting the presence of a clear signal in an otherwise noise-free 
environment is probably the simplest perceptual act of which the human is capable” (p. 
160). Because of this, it allows for the study of basic attentional processes without the 
confounding issue of distractors. Divided attention consists of splitting attention equally 
between two separate and distinct stimuli. This has commonly been tested through the 
use of dichotic listening tasks (Somberg & Salthouse, 1982), but is also assessed using 
dual visual displays. Divided attention tasks allow attention to be studied under greater 
constraints such as heavier workload, which can shed light on resource and capacity 
abilities.  
 Selective attention is the process through which multiple sources of information 
are processed differentially based on relevance (Johnston & Dark, 1986), and it is what is 
employed most often in directing thought and action. This is because organisms are 
rarely, if ever, faced with a single stimulus to which they must attend. The environment is 
rich with distractors, from noises to visual cues to superfluous thoughts. For example, in 
order to drive safely one must necessarily attend to the road, other vehicles, signs, even 
pedestrians. But one must also refrain from being distracted by the radio, loud 
passengers, or considerations of personal problems or upcoming activities. If a person is 
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unable to do this, he will not be able to drive optimally and is more likely to be involved 
in an accident. Therefore, selective attention is essential in order to complete a task 
efficiently and optimally.  
 Selective attention consists of dual processes that involve both enhancing relevant 
features of a task and inhibiting irrelevant features. Returning to the driving example 
given above, these processes would enhance stimuli such as the road while inhibiting or 
suppressing distracting stimuli such as passengers. Enhancement is achieved through the 
activation of mental representations that are important to task completion. Similarly, 
suppression occurs when inhibition mechanisms act on representations that have been 
activated by distractor input (Tipper, Weaver, & Kirkpatrick, 1991). Another way to 
conceptualize this process is through a match/mismatch paradigm. When visual input is 
received, the information is reviewed to find an object that matches one’s internal 
representation of the target. Matching objects are activated, while mismatching objects 
are inhibited in order to prevent not only an incorrect response, but also the slowing of a 
reaction to the target (Houghton, Tipper, Weaver, & Shore, 1996).  
 Houghton et al. (1996) explain why it is necessary to have two separate systems 
for selective attention. First, with two systems the activation levels of the target and 
distractor can be more quickly and more widely separated. This is because the target’s 
activation level will increase while the distractor’s activation level decreases, as opposed 
to the target’s activation level increasing against a stable, competing distractor. Second, if 
two stimuli of similar strength are detected, neither representation would be able to be 
selected by either excitatory or inhibitory mechanisms alone. This is because with two 
intense stimuli, there is little room for enhancement of a target, while with two very weak 
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stimuli there is little room for inhibition. It is only by using both systems that a target can 
always be detected.  
 One phenomenon that provides support for the inhibition theory of selective 
attention is negative priming (Tipper, 1985). In negative priming, both a target and a 
distractor are presented simultaneously during a trial. In the proceeding probe trial, the 
distractor is then presented as the target. Reaction times in the probe trials have been 
found to be significantly slower than baseline trials, and this slowing has been attributed 
to the attempt to process inhibited internal representations (Tipper et al., 1991). As 
expected, the less a distractor is attended to, such as if there are many distractors to 
choose from, the less negative priming is observed. 
 While there is much support for the inhibition theory, others believe that selective 
attention actually works by enhancing relevant information instead of suppressing 
irrelevant information. Egner and Hirsch (2005) have found that this may actually be the 
case. They explain that the brain region usually thought to be responsible for inhibitory 
control, the prefrontal cortex (PFC), can perform the same functions through 
enhancement and that it intuitively makes more sense to conceptualize the PFC as being 
responsible for executing goal-directed thought and action instead of inhibiting stimuli 
that would interfere with this process. To test this, they presented participants with 
pictures of faces with words superimposed and varied whether the face or the word was 
the relevant information to which they should respond. The faces were of famous 
individuals, with either that individual’s name printed over the face (a congruent trial) or 
another individual’s name printed over the face (an incongruent trial). By doing this, 
Egner and Hirsch (2005) were able to differentiate between neurological responses 
7 
following either congruent trials, where cognitive control is low, or incongruent trials, 
where cognitive control is high.  
The authors found that on trials where the face was relevant, the brain region 
within the PFC that is active during face recognition, the fusiform face area (FFA) was 
indeed active. While it was active following congruent trials, it showed even higher 
levels of activity following incongruent trials. However, no modulations in activity in the 
FFA were observed following trials where the face was irrelevant. Egner and Hirsch 
(2005) explain that this finding indicates that the FFA was not inhibited when it was 
irrelevant; it was merely not active. This is because one would expect varying levels of 
activity in an area that is being inhibited when the level of available cognitive control 
varies, but this was not found. This supports the view of selective attention as an 
enhancement process, not an inhibitory one. Unfortunately, there are few studies at this 
point that have looked at selective attention from this angle, most likely in part because 
there are few, if any behavioral paradigms that allow one to separate enhancement from 
inhibitory processes. Perhaps with the greater use of neuroimaging research this question 
will find greater clarity.   
 The effects of impaired selective attention are far-reaching, especially in our 
present society that demands services 24-hours-a-day and makes few allowances for rest 
or recuperation. Many of today’s occupations require sustained attention, such as ship, 
air, truck, rail, or plant operators, and maintaining a level of attention necessary for 
adequate performance has proved difficult (Jung, Makeig, Stensmo, & Sejnowski, 1997).  
One study on railway accidents in Australia highlights the impact of selective attention in 
industry (Edkins & Pollock, 1997). The aim of the study was to determine the 
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contributing factors that appeared as common denominators in railway accidents. This 
was accomplished by first retrospectively categorizing the type of accident, such as a 
collision or operating a train in an unauthorized area. Each accident was then traced back 
to determine whether the event was precipitated by active failures on the part of the train 
operator or by latent failures on the part of the organization. These failures were further 
classified as being the result of either an unintended error or an intended violation, as 
well as whether the violations were allowed by the organization or necessary. 
Independent raters further classified accidents according to psychological precursors, 
which included both individual and organizational factors that influenced the accident. 
Finally, a checklist was developed that allowed railway workers and management to 
report problems that may lead to decreased safety, and this information was used to 
classify each accident by the most pervasive problem. They found that 70% of all 
accidents were due to attentional factors such as the misallocation of attention (Edkins & 
Pollock, 1997). It will only be through discovering the factors that affect and impair 
selective attention that industry will be able to begin to prevent these incidents. The 
current research will examine two such factors, mental fatigue and alcohol. 
Mental Fatigue 
 Historically, mental fatigue has been difficult to define. This has stemmed in part 
from a lack of research on the topic, and unfortunately has also contributed to the 
continued trouble in understanding a commonly-experienced phenomenon (Boksem, 
Meijman, & Lorist, 2005). Many definitions address the external cause of mental fatigue, 
such as one given by Boksem et al. (2005): “Mental fatigue refers to the effects that 
people may experience after or during prolonged periods of cognitive activity” (p. 107). 
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This does not give any information as to the internal systems that underlie fatigued states 
or any probable outcomes. Other definitions set more boundaries, such as van der Linden, 
Frese, and Sonnentag’s (2003) that states, “Mental fatigue can be defined as a 
psychophysiological state resulting from sustained performance on cognitively 
demanding tasks and coinciding with changes in motivation, information processing, and 
mood” (p. 484). Again, this does not explain any internal causes of fatigue, which are of 
central interest if fatigue is to be fully understood. 
 The definition of mental fatigue used for the purposes of this research is given by 
Soames-Job and Dalziel (2001): “Fatigue refers to the state of an organism’s…central 
nervous system, in which prior…mental processing, in the absence of sufficient rest, 
results in insufficient cellular capacity or system-wide energy to maintain the original 
level of activity and/or processing by using normal resources” (p. 469). This definition is 
the most comprehensive and useful for a number of reasons. First, the external cause of 
mental fatigue is addressed by attributing the state to “prior mental processing,” which 
can mean any type of mental activity from sustained attention to an auditory task. 
Second, “in the absence of sufficient rest” implies that the amount of necessary rest 
varies from person to person and that any amount of rest to be had within a given task 
may be enough to counteract the effects of mental fatigue. Third, “insufficient cellular 
capacity or system-wide energy” locates the internal cause of mental fatigue, be it on the 
neural cellular level or a system-wide level. Finally, “to maintain the original level of 
activity and/or processing by using normal resources” indicates that while there is a 
change in mental processing due to fatigue, performance itself may not decline. This is 
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because other internal or external resources may be used to compensate for failing 
systems until sufficient rest is obtained (Soames-Job & Dalziel, 2001).  
 Given the above definition of mental fatigue, it is not surprising that there are 
countless methods by which to induce such a state. A variety of procedures has been used 
in the literature, although the most common technique is via computer. Standard 
procedure has the participant perform a computer-based task such as a continuous 
performance task (van der Linden, Massar, Schellekens, Ellenbroek, & Verkes, 2006), a 
scheduling task (van der Linden et al., 2003), or a switch task (Lorist et al., 2000) for 
between one and a half to three hours. However, it should again be noted that while 
computer-based tasks are most common for inducing mental fatigue, other methods are 
also used. For example, a study by Matthews and Desmond (2002) induced mental 
fatigue by having participants drive in a simulator while performing a secondary task of 
monitoring for pedestrians. Performance is then assessed as time on task (Galinsky, Rosa, 
Warm, & Dember, 1993) or through the use of a separate cognitive measure, such as the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (van der Linden, Frese, & Meijman, 2002). In the latter 
case, cognitive measures are administered after mental fatigue induction to locate 
declines in performance. 
 Mental fatigue’s effects can be broken down into three distinct categories: 
subjective, behavioral, and physiological responses. Subjective responses are those 
reported by participants during the course of an experiment. When fatigued, participants 
commonly complain of a diminished capacity for work, disinclination to apply effort to 
the task, perceived reductions in personal efficiency, and subjective discomfort and 
tiredness (Matthews & Desmond, 2002). Participants are more likely to become irritable 
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and experience negative mood shifts (Galinsky et al., 1993) and because of this are more 
likely to disengage from the task itself (van der Linden et al., 2003).  
 These complaints are often difficult to separate conceptually from other factors 
such as a lack of motivation, boredom, habituation, or physical fatigue. However, mental 
fatigue is qualitatively distinct from these issues, especially when regarded in light of the 
definition given above. A lack of motivation and boredom may result from previous 
exposure to a task, performing a task that is too simple, or being disinterested in the task, 
and these two problems often manifest as performing at suboptimal levels. But these two 
problems are not linked to cellular or system-wide energy decrements, so unlike mental 
fatigue, performance will not be improved by rest (Soames-Job and Dalziel, 2001). 
Habituation may also initially appear behaviorally similar to mental fatigue, but 
habituation is a form of learning and is once again not linked to a lack of energy, so 
habituation to a stimulus will persist over rest while mental fatigue will not (Soames-Job 
and Dalziel, 2001). Physical fatigue is also a separate entity. Mental fatigue is strongly 
marked by aversion, whether it is to expend any more mental energy or to continue a 
task, while physical fatigue is not. These two states highlight the difference between 
being willing to apply effort but not being physically able and being physically able to 
apply effort but not being willing (Schwartz, 1999).  
 One of the most consistent behavioral impairments caused by mental fatigue is a 
change in attention. Attentional tasks show a decline in performance due to sustained 
attention (Galinsky et al., 1993), which includes not only a decrease in signal detection 
probability, but also an increase in overall reaction times. While mentally fatigued, 
participants shift from exhibiting goal-driven behavior to stimulus-driven behavior (van 
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der Linden et al., 2003). Goal-driven behavior consists of executing planned actions to 
accomplish a purpose, whereas stimulus-driven behavior consists of responding to 
environmental information based on its salience. Participants may make this shift because 
mental fatigue weakens the general cognitive inhibitory process (Schwartz, 1999). In 
order to perform a task optimally, one must not only pay attention to relevant stimuli, but 
also ignore or suppress irrelevant stimuli. When a person becomes mentally fatigued, the 
activity of attentional focus itself remains unaffected while the inhibitory processes are 
diminished (Houghton et al., 1996; Schwartz, 1999). This means that on a selective 
attention task, where inhibition is key to favorable performance, more difficulties will be 
observed. Because mental fatigue produces global changes in inhibitory processes, 
behavioral changes are not task-specific, but rather generalize across tasks. 
 One study that supports the theory that inhibitory processes are diminished under 
mental fatigue comes from research on sensorimotor gating and pre-pulse inhibition (PPI) 
(van der Linden et al., 2006). Sensorimotor gating refers to the protection of stimulus 
processing from interference that is caused by subsequent incoming information. It has 
been shown to play a role in cognitive control and attention, which are thought to be 
compromised under mental fatigue. Sensorimotor gating can be assessed by pre-pulse 
inhibition, which occurs when a participant’s startle response to an intense stimulus is 
reduced by first presenting a lower-intensity stimulus. It is believed that sensorimotor 
gating prevents the full processing of the intense stimulus due to the current processing of 
the pre-pulse stimulus. This means that some of the effects of PPI are due to inhibition of 
the startle response’s primary pathway.  
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 Pre-pulse inhibition facilitates goal-driven behavior, and people with low PPI 
often display problems with attention and the inhibition of distractors. It was found that 
mentally fatigued participants did show a significant decrease in PPI, which is 
representative of a lowered sensorimotor gating ability (van der Linden et al., 2006). This 
suggests that the difficulties that are typically associated with mental fatigue might partly 
arise from disturbances in the cognitive mechanism responsible for preventing 
interference from task-irrelevant stimuli or cognitions. 
 The shift from goal- to stimulus-driven behavior is also why complex behavior 
shows decrements under mental fatigue while simpler tasks do not. Simple tasks are often 
stimulus-driven and are thus unaffected by mental fatigue. On the other hand, complex 
tasks require participants to make use of higher-order cognitive processes, which are 
more sensitive to fatigue (Lorist et al., 2000). Because complex tasks are dependent upon 
goal-driven behavior, when inhibitory processes are weakened the ability to perform 
complex behavior declines (Matthews & Desmond, 2002; van der Linden et al., 2003).  
 It is hypothesized that mental fatigue acts to impair inhibitory processes, and thus 
attention, in two different ways. The first is through depletion of energetical resources. It 
is believed that attention is sustained through energetical pools that, over time, will run 
low due to cognitive demand. Information processing relies on these pools in order to 
efficiently regulate higher-order cognitive functioning (Lorist et al., 2000). Complex, 
cognitively demanding tasks rely on higher-level cognitive functioning, causing them to 
be more vulnerable to impairments caused by mental fatigue because they rely more 
heavily on energetical pools than do simple or automated tasks (Lorist et al., 2000; van 
der Linden et al., 2003). This is supported by research showing that mental fatigue does 
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not impair automated tasks, but does affect complex task performance (Lorist et al., 
2000).  
 The second way mental fatigue may impair attention is through a loss of effort 
regulation. This theory posits that energetical pools themselves are not lost, but the ability 
to allocate those resources correctly and efficiently is (Matthews & Desmond, 2002). 
Here, a person will either voluntarily or involuntarily reduce engagement in a task (van 
der Linden et al., 2003), especially when the task is perceived to be simple and require 
minimal attention or effort (Matthews & Desmond, 2002). This means that even a 
mentally fatigued person has the ability to perform complex tasks as well as a non-
fatigued person, as long as she is motivated or the task is complex enough to warrant a 
certain amount of effort (Matthews & Desmond, 2002).  
 Both theories have been supported in the literature, but a resolution of these 
differences may be possible. Matthews and Desmond (2002) found that performance on a 
driving simulator task after inducing mental fatigue was dependent on the difficulty of 
the task; the easy, straight section of road showed driving impairment when the 
participant was mentally fatigued while the more difficult, curved section did not. They 
attribute these differences to a loss of effort regulation, not energetical resources because 
if energetical resources had been depleted participants would have performed more 
poorly on the difficult, curved section. Instead, they performed more poorly on the easier, 
straight section, which implies that participants underestimated the level of performance 
necessary. However, van der Linden et al. (2003) found that during mental fatigue, 
performance does not completely break down, but is instead marked by reduced task 
engagement that produces mediocre performance. This reduced engagement may be from 
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a lack of effort, but it may also be from a temporary lack of resources. When a person 
applies less effort, which may be an attempt to not only temporarily halt energetic 
depletion, but also to give those pools time to recover in order to perform a task once 
again to the highest level possible.  
 One class of tasks that may appear highly related to mental fatigue research is that 
of vigilance. Vigilance tasks are common in both real-world and laboratory settings and 
require a person to monitor a display for a temporally-uncertain target that occurs amid 
more common neutral signals. A consistent finding is that target detection decreases over 
time spent on the task, a phenomenon known as the vigilance decrement (Parasuraman, 
1986). This may appear similar to findings on mental fatigue, which show that 
performance declines with time spent on the task. Some common laboratory vigilance 
tasks do assess selective as well as sustained attention (Bearden, Cassisi, & White, 2004) 
and after prolonged performance may also elicit subjective complaints similar to that of 
mental fatigue (Helton et al., 2005).  
 However, vigilance should not be confused with mental fatigue. While vigilance 
produces a decrease in performance and signal sensitivity over time, it does so for 
different reasons than mental fatigue. Though once believed to be relatively simple and 
benign, recent research has found that vigilance tasks are actually quite taxing and 
stressful (Grier et al., 2003). Vigilance problems are hypothesized to be the result of 
overloading the information-processing system, and the subsequent decrement in 
performance is a consequence of the participant attempting to reduce the stress that arises 
from this overload (Grier et al., 2003). This means that while vigilance tasks may lead to 
disengagement and lowered performance in the form of signal detection, this shift is a 
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voluntary method for coping with the stress of task demands (Helton et al., 2005). Mental 
fatigue, on the other hand, is believed to be an involuntary and uncontrolled outcome of 
prolonged mental processing that results in global, not specific, changes in processing 
(Soames-Job & Dalziel, 2001). These global changes are perhaps best illustrated by the 
fact that vigilance decrements are task-specific and can be ameliorated by changing tasks 
(Parasuraman, 1986), whereas mental fatigue’s effects transfer across tasks. Most 
importantly, the vigilance decrement has not been attributed to deficits in inhibitory 
processes, unlike mental fatigue.  
Alcohol  
 Alcohol consumption produces a variety of subjective responses depending upon 
the level of intoxication. Alcohol is generally thought of as a depressant, but for many 
people alcohol actually serves as a stimulant at low blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) 
on the ascending limb of the blood alcohol curve (Martin, Earleywine, Musty, Perrine, & 
Swift, 1993). However, these subjective differences show much individual variability in 
both the magnitude of the effect and the BAC at which it occurs. Sedative effects 
generally appear at higher BACs and on the descending limb of the blood alcohol curve, 
but also with variability (Martin et al., 1993). Alcohol’s stimulant-like effects generally 
manifest as feelings of euphoria and elation, emotional expression, and talkativeness 
(Holdstock & de Wit, 1998), whereas sedative effects include difficulty concentrating, 
inactivity and sluggishness, slow thoughts, and tiredness (Martin et al., 1993).  
 Alcohol consumption among young adults in the US is a problem. While the legal 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit in most states is 0.08%, studies report subjective 
intoxication at BACs as low as 0.05-0.06%, along with slowed visual search speed 
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(Newman, Speake, Armstrong, & Tiplady, 1997) and impairments in divided attention 
(Schulte, Muller-Oehring, Strasburger, Warzel, & Sabel, 2001). Previously, the deficits 
caused by alcohol consumption were believed to be attributable to a generalized slowing 
of reaction time, but research has shown that BACs of 0.08-0.10% only slow reaction 
time by no more than 10% (Newman et al., 1997). Recent theories indicate that the real 
issue is alcohol’s impairment of selective attention and attentional control (Fillmore, 
Dixon, and Schweizer, 2000).  
 Alcohol has been shown to produce a variety of behavioral impairments even at 
low to moderate blood alcohol levels. BACs of less than 0.08% impair psychomotor 
function, learning, memory, and attention (Falleti, Maruff, Collie, Darby, & McStephen, 
2003). Attention appears to be particularly vulnerable, and alcohol has been shown to 
affect measures of attention such as choice reaction time (Falleti et al., 2003), and visual 
search (Newman et al., 1997). This is because, unlike in simple cognitive processing 
tasks, these complex tasks require control over attentional resources. This would explain 
why divided and selective attention tasks show performance decrements during 
intoxication while more automatic processes like simple reaction time tasks do not 
(Schulte et al., 2001). 
 An example of alcohol’s effects on controlled but not automatic processes is the 
slowing of reaction time to a random target after a repetitive sequence during choice 
reaction time tasks. This may be because during the repetition sequences, participants are 
not limited by their information-processing capacity, but rather by their choice or 
judgment. When the task again switches to a random target, the slowing down may be 
caused by the time needed to engage controlled processing once again after a period of 
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automaticity. This can be compared to the types of automobile accidents that are 
associated with alcohol: that of single cars crashing on a bend in the road after a stretch 
of straight, unimpeded driving (Newman et al., 1997).  
 Until recently, little research has been done on the effects of alcohol on selective 
attention. Numerous theories have been put forth as to the cause of alcohol’s detrimental 
effects on attention, such as one that attributes the difficulties to alcohol’s slowing down 
of cognitive processing speed (Moskowitz, Burns, & Williams, 1985). A newer theory, 
however, explains attentional decrements through the suppression of inhibitory processes. 
Here, alcohol does not affect the attentional processes that identify and highlight target 
stimuli, but rather compromises the ability of inhibitory processes to suppress distracting 
information. Fillmore et al. (2000) tested inhibitory processes in 28 male participants by 
using a Stroop task to measure negative priming. They found that participants, while at a 
BAC of 0.06% on the ascending limb of the blood alcohol curve, did not show any 
negative priming. Negative priming is believed to be a key indicator of inhibitory 
processes at work in selective attention, and the lack of negative priming is evidence that 
those inhibitory processes are not functioning to their fullest extent (Tipper et al., 1991).  
 A further study by Abroms, Gottlob, & Fillmore (2006) provides additional 
support for the theory that alcohol impairs inhibitory control. The study compared 
participants’ performance on a saccadic interference (SI) task, where a distractor stimulus 
is presented during a saccade to produce interference, and a delayed ocular response 
(DOR), where a visual stimulus is presented and participants are required to delay the 
saccade to the target. SI provides a measure of automatic inhibitory control, while DOR 
reflects intentional inhibitory control. Results showed that automatic inhibitory control 
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remained intact under alcohol, but intentional inhibitory control deteriorated with rising 
BACs. Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, similar outcomes are seen in 
participants with mental fatigue, indicating again that it is the same underlying processes 
responsible for deficits in selective attention in both conditions.  
 There have been contradictory findings on the existence of behavioral differences 
on the ascending versus descending limb of the blood alcohol curve. Some studies report 
finding deficits on the ascending but not the descending limb (Fillmore et al., 2000), 
while others find no difference (Newman et al., 1997). One reason effects may be seen on 
the ascending limb but not the descending is due to acute tolerance. This occurs during 
physiological exposure to a drug over time and is attributed to an adaptive process 
wherein one develops the ability to function at a near-normal performance level in spite 
of still being under the influence. Little is known about the cognitive effects of acute 
tolerance, so it is possible that some studies report deficits on both limbs because the 
BACs that are being achieved are too high to allow participants to compensate (Fillmore 
et al., 2000). 
 The aim of the present research is to further the understanding of the manner and 
the extent to which mental fatigue and alcohol impair selective attention. It is surprising 
that mental fatigue and alcohol have never been directly compared, especially since it is 
hypothesized that both act to impair selective attention through the same process. 
Additionally, there is a large amount of information on the practical effects of alcohol on 
tasks necessary to daily life, especially driving ability. However, there is not nearly as 
much research on the practical effects of mental fatigue outside of driving simulator 
studies (e.g., Matthews & Desmond, 2002). Even with driving simulator research, it does 
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not elucidate exactly what mental fatigue may do to actual driving ability or the risk of 
having an accident. Directly comparing alcohol and mental fatigue on the same metric 
will give clarity to the practical effects of mental fatigue on driving ability.   
 On the basis that alcohol and mental fatigue both impair inhibitory processes, it is 
hypothesized that both will significantly increase the time needed to identify targets in a 
selective attention task. What is unknown, and is of primary interest to this research, is 
the differential extent to which alcohol and mental fatigue will increase this identification 
time. Specifically, we hypothesize that both alcohol and mental fatigue will increase 
identification time.  However, the absence of any literature comparing the effects of both 
treatments on a common metric does not permit a reasoned prediction about the level of 
impairment produced by mental fatigue relative to that induced by alcohol.  To the extent 
that fatigue can be consistently induced it may well be the case that its effects are similar 
to those of alcohol.  Alternatively, because mental fatigue is inherently aversive to 
individuals, participants may find subtle ways to divert attention from the fatiguing task.  
If this happens, the increase in target identification over time may be less in the mental 
fatigue condition than in the alcohol condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 32 graduate students from Western Kentucky University. They 
were informed that the study was examining the effects of either mental fatigue or 
alcohol on performance of a computer task. Participants in both the mental fatigue and 
alcohol conditions were screened before participation for alcohol dependency or 
excessive drinking. Participants were asked to fast and refrain from drinking caffeinated 
beverages for four hours prior to the experiment and to not use any tobacco products for 
two hours or consume alcohol for 24 hours prior to the experiment. Additionally, they 
were also screened for both prescription and over-the-counter medication use. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and each received $60 for their 
participation. A total of six participants were excluded from the study, three due to a 
positive screening for alcohol problems and three due to an inability to complete the 
assigned tasks sufficiently (Table 1).  
Table 1  
 
Participant Exclusion 
 
Stage                 n Excluded       Condition            Reason for Exclusion
 
Prescreening            3                Not Assigned       Positive screening for alcohol problem 
 
Prescreening            2                Not Assigned       Medication counterindicated for alcohol 
 
Baseline          1               Mental Fatigue      Unable to optimize 
 
Data Analysis          2               Mental Fatigue      Not stabilized at baseline 
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Materials 
Selective attention. The stimuli were presented using the useful field of view (UFOV) test 
(Ball, Roenker & Bruni, 1990). This test produces a measure of visual attention under 
brief time conditions. The UFOV contains three subtests, two of which were employed in 
this study. The first is a measure of divided attention and requires participants to identify 
a central target as well as locate a peripheral target. The second is a measure of selective 
attention and requires participants to also identify a central target and locate a peripheral 
target, but in this task the peripheral target is embedded in distractors. Outcomes are 
expressed as the minimum length of time in milliseconds needed to identify targets 
correctly on 70% of the trials. The UFOV has a refresh rate of 16.7 ms, meaning that all 
frames are displayed for a length of time that is either 16.7 ms or a multiple of that 
number. For example, the next slowest display would be presented for 33.4 ms. 
Participant scores are calculated as an average of the final five trials. Deficits on the 
UFOV have been associated with a slowing in visual task performance, leading to such 
problems as impaired driving and vehicle crash involvement (Owsley & McGwin, 2004). 
Drinking habits. The Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (AUDIT) (Bohn, Barbor, 
& Kranzler, 1995) is a 10-item questionnaire that gathers information pertaining to a 
participant’s frequency of drinking and amount of consumption, as well as negative 
behaviors that have arisen in the past year from drinking. Scores range from 0-40, and a 
score equal to or greater than six is considered a positive screening result for alcohol 
problems. Consequently, three participants who score a six or greater were excluded from 
the study (M = 12).  
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Blood alcohol concentrations (BACs). BACs were calculated from breath samples 
analyzed by the breathalyzer Alcohawk Pro (Q3 Innovations, LLC, Independence, IA). 
Mental fatigue. Subsection B of the Symptoms of Fatigue Scale (Yoshitake, 1971) was 
used to assess subjective mental fatigue. This is a 10-item questionnaire that measures 
“decline of working motivation” (Yoshitake, 1971) by having participants answer 
questions on a nine-point likert scale with anchors of “feeling fit, rested” and “feeling 
extremely tired, exhausted.”  
Subjective intoxication. The Biphasic Alcohol Effects Scale (BAES) (Martin et al., 1993) 
measures the subjective stimulant- and sedative-like effects of alcohol. It consists of 14 
adjectives that participants rate from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) by circling the 
number that best describes their current state. It has high internal consistency on both the 
ascending limb (stimulant subscale α = .94; sedative subscale α = .85) and the descending 
limb (stimulant subscale α = .94; sedative subscale α = .91). 
Procedure 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatment groups, either 
alcohol ingestion (n = 10) or mental fatigue (n = 14). An explanation of the participant’s 
particular group and restrictions on participation were given before written consent was 
obtained, and they then completed the AUDIT and provided a list of all prescription 
medications they were currently taking. Those who were taking any medication with a 
counterindication for alcohol, such as antidepressants or antihistamines, were not allowed 
to participate. This excluded two participants who were on such medications. Participants 
were also asked about any over-the-counter (OTC) medications they had taken in the past 
24 hours. If they had taken any OTC medications in that time period it was ensured that 
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an extra two hours were allowed beyond the drug’s recommended duration to allow it to 
metabolize completely. For example, a participant would have needed to take medication 
with a duration of six hours a minimum of eight hours prior to their lab appointment or 
they were not allowed to participate. No participants were excluded for this reason.   
 Next, participants in both groups completed the divided and selective attention 
subtests of the UFOV until they had three consecutive blocks with outcomes that were all 
within one standard deviation of one another. This was done to ensure proficiency and 
optimization of the task, which reduced the interference of practice effects. One 
participant was excluded due to an inability to achieve optimization and did not complete 
the baseline session. After optimization, participants remained in the lab and completed 
the selective attention subtest every 30 minutes a total of four times, providing a baseline 
against which to compare the experimental data and allowing participants to serve as 
their own control group. Upon completion of the final selective attention subtest, 
participants were allowed to leave. 
 Participants returned to the lab the same day and time the following week to 
complete the experimental session. All were again asked to refrain from eating or 
consuming any caffeine for four hours, using tobacco products for two hours, and 
consuming alcohol for 24 hours prior to testing, and were again also asked to report any 
OTC medications they had taken within the previous 24 hours. Again, this did not 
exclude any participants. Once in the lab, the participants in the mental fatigue condition 
completed the Symptoms of Fatigue Scale and then began performing the divided 
attention subtest of the UFOV for two hours in order to induce mental fatigue. After 
beginning, they completed the selective attention subtest of the UFOV every 30 minutes 
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in order to measure selective attention. This not only provided multiple measures of the 
deterioration of selective attention functioning, but also allowed for a comparison 
between the mental fatigue and alcohol groups by measuring functioning for each group 
at the same points along the time course of the experimental conditions. After completion 
of the UFOV, participants completed the Symptoms of Fatigue Scale and were allowed to 
leave. 
  Participants in the alcohol condition returned to the lab the same day and time the 
following week and were weighed and given a breathalyzer to ensure a BAC of 0.00%. 
All participants in this condition were 21 years of age or older, and females were 
screened for pregnancy through self-report and urine analysis. They then completed the 
Symptoms of Fatigue Scale and received their treatment. Females received 1.12oz/100lbs 
and males received 1.28oz/100lbs of ethanol mixed with orange juice in a 1:5 ratio. Each 
beverage was divided into five separate glasses, and participants were asked to drink one 
glass every two minutes until all five glasses had been consumed. Twenty minutes after 
the consumption of the last beverage they completed the selective attention subtest of the 
UFOV. They repeated this process of consuming a drink and then completing the 
selective attention subtest until their BAC reached 0.05%, which was approximately four 
drinks, or two hours. After completing the selective attention subtest one final time, 
participants filled out the Symptoms of Fatigue Scale again in order to ensure that any 
attentional deficits were due to alcohol alone and not from a combination of alcohol and 
mental fatigue. All participants in the alcohol condition were then retained in the lab until 
their BAC returned to 0.00%. 
 
 Results 
Manipulation Check - Subjective measures  
 Participants in the mental fatigue condition reported an increase in feelings of 
subjective mental fatigue from before beginning the fatigue-induction (M = 2.87, SD = 
1.53) to completion of fatigue-induction (M = 4.33, SD = 1.76). This significant increase 
indicates that the task was successful in inducing feelings of mental fatigue, t(13) = 
3.418, p = .005. Those in the alcohol condition did not report a similar increase in 
subjective mental fatigue from the beginning of the experimental condition (M = 2.31, SD 
= 1.68) to completion (M = 2.99, SD = 1.62), t(8) = 1.12, p > .05. All of the participants 
in the alcohol condition reached the minimum blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.05% by 
either the third (n = 6) or the fourth drink (n = 4). However, they did not report 
differential stimulant- or sedative-like effects based on which limb of the blood alcohol 
curve they were experiencing. Those on the ascending limb did not report greater 
stimulant-like over sedative-like effects, t(5) = 1.06, p > .05 and those on the descending 
limb did not report greater sedative-like over stimulant-like effects, t(3) = 0.64, p > .05. 
Cognitive measures  
 It should be recalled that the design permitted a determination of the stability of 
the UFOV selective attention measure at both baseline and in the two experimental 
conditions. The purpose of this was to assess the relative consistency in performance by 
examining the variance in the final three blocks, which were completed consecutively. 
Stability indices for each participant at both baseline and experimental session were 
derived by calculating standard deviations of the final three blocks. Participants were 
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defined as being stabilized if their stability index fell within one standard deviation of the 
mean of the overall baseline stability index (M = 
10.82, SD = 7.04). Based on this criteria, two participants from the mental fatigue 
condition were excluded from further analyses (Stability Indices = 36.6; 53.44).   
 The overall mean stability indices for the two experimental groups are shown in 
Table 2. The mean stability index differed significantly from baseline (M = 10.82, SD = 
7.04) to experimental session (M = 7.51, SD = 6.45) (t(23) = 2.14, p = .044), with 
participants becoming slightly less variable in their performance during the final three 
blocks of the experimental session. The baseline and experimental session stability 
indices were also examined for a difference from zero, as a standard deviation of zero 
would indicate perfect stability. Both session means differed significantly from zero 
(baseline t(23) = 7.54, p < .05; experimental t(23) = 5.71, p < .05), which indicates that 
participants were still somewhat variable in their performance during three consecutive 
measurements. As may be recalled, measurements were taken every 30 minutes and then 
three consecutive times at the last measurement opportunity, both at baseline and at the 
end of the experimental session. In the analyses below the mean of these last three 
measurements was used as the measurement at the fourth time period. Table 3 shows 
performance by group at each of the four baseline and experimental session blocks. 
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Table 2 
 
Mean Stability Indices by Condition 
                 
Condition                              Baseline                             Experimental              
            
Alcohol             9.81    7.24   
 
Mental Fatigue            11.55    7.70 
 
Table 3 
Mean Performance by Block  
 
 
Condition              Baseline 1              Baseline 2              Baseline 3              Baseline 4
        M         SD             M         SD        M          SD   M     SD 
 
Alcohol    23.01     10.07         29.69     20.44      41.37     23.53        26.48      9.09     
 
Mental Fatigue   39.32     15.74         30.52     15.14       35.76     18.54 33.13    13.06 
 
 
Condition             Experiment 1         Experiment 2          Experiment 3        Experiment 4
        M         SD             M         SD          M         SD    M     SD 
 
Alcohol     26.37    11.69         31.70    17.23         29.37    14.28       31.50       17.15   
 
Mental Fatigue    29.79    28.01         25.05    11.39         24.80      8.23       27.68         7.61 
 
 A repeated-measures 2 (condition) x 4 (block) ANOVA performed on the 
baseline scores revealed a significant interaction (F(3, 20) = 3.42, p < .05; η2 = .339), 
with the two groups differing in their performance on the first block (mental fatigue M = 
39.32, SD = 15.74; alcohol M = 23.01, SD = 10.07) (F(1, 22) = 8.46, p = .009). No 
differences were observed on any subsequent blocks.  There were no main effects for 
condition (F(1, 22) = 1.54, p > .05), but a main effect was found for block (F(5, 18) = 
4.32, p = .009), with display time decreasing over the baseline blocks.  
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 To assess change in performance over time between baseline and experimental 
sessions, difference scores for each participant were computed by subtracting baseline 
scores from experimental-condition scores. This provided a single performance measure 
for each participant at four 30-minute intervals. A repeated-measures 2 (condition) x 4 
(block) ANOVA performed on the difference scores did not reveal an interaction 
(F(3,20) = .651, p > .05; η2 = .031; β = .729) (Figure 1). Note that because these tests did 
not reach significance it is not appropriate to discuss the level of power involved. Instead, 
beta (β), or the level of type II error, is reported. There were no main effects for block 
(F(3, 20) = 1.18, p > .05; η2 = .061; β = .904) or condition (F(1, 22) = 1.53, p > .05; η2 = 
.065; β = .78). Figure 1 illustrates the mean difference scores for each of the four blocks 
by condition as well as 95% confidence intervals about each mean.  An inspection of the 
figure shows that none of the mean difference scores at any time block differed 
significantly from zero.  Thus, at no point in the experiment was performance on the task  
significantly different from baseline, indicating that neither the fatigue nor alcohol  
 
condition were effective in decreasing selective attention performance. 
 
 As a final evaluation of the data, regression formulas were calculated by 
regressing each experimental block on its corresponding baseline block. From these four 
equations the residuals for each experimental block were found, and a repeated-measures 
2 (condition) x 4 (block) ANOVA was performed on the error terms. No interaction was 
found (F(3, 20) = .201, p > .05; η2 = .029; β = .919). Additionally, there were no main 
effects for block (F(3, 20) = .005, p > .05; η2 = .001; β = .949) or condition (F(1, 22) = 
3.606, p > .05; η2 = .141; β = .557).  
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Figure 1 
Mean Difference Scores by Condition 
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 Discussion 
 This study attempted to identify and compare a connection between the 
attentional impairments observed during alcohol intoxication and mental fatigue. It was 
hypothesized that both would significantly increase the time needed to identify targets in 
the selective attention subtest of the Useful Field of View (UFOV) test. However, this 
was unsupported by the current findings; neither alcohol nor mental fatigue produced a 
significant decrement in performance on the selective attention task. Also of interest was 
the time course of the effect of mental fatigue. Again, mental fatigue did not appear to 
affect performance at any of the 30-minute intervals, and performance did not change 
over the course of the two-hour experimental session.  
 Neither experimental condition affected participants’ performance on the UFOV, 
which was used to assess selective attention. There are some possible reasons why 
participants failed to show an attentional decrement. First, the UFOV’s selective attention 
subtest may not be a sensitive enough measure for a younger sample. The UFOV’s 
stimulus duration range is from about 17-500 ms. Typically, the UFOV is used to identify 
deficits in older adults, whose scores fall in the middle of that scale. Participants in this 
study, graduate students, routinely achieved scores at baseline of 17 ms. These low scores 
indicate that there may be a floor effect, and that even at floor the task is too simple. 
While the average scores shown on Tables 1 and 2 are above that baseline, recall that the 
refresh rate of the UFOV is 16.7 ms and the final score is an average of the final five 
correct trials. The majority of blocks in the baseline condition and all the blocks in the 
experimental condition have average scores below 33.4 ms. This shows that while 
participants did not have perfect scores at floor, they were still correctly identifying 
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targets at this speed. Even if the alcohol or mental fatigue conditions did impair these 
young participants, it might not have been enough to see an effect if selective attention 
task was not demanding enough to assess a true optimal baseline score.  
 A second possibility for why an effect was not observed in the mental fatigue 
condition is that the selective attention task was too salient compared to the divided 
attention task, which was used to fatigue participants. In this case, the selective attention 
task would elicit a ‘pop-out’ effect, temporarily increasing arousal and aiding in 
performance. This pop-out effect would have been facilitated by the selective attention 
task being more difficult than the divided attention task, as well as that it would appear 
more novel to the participant after spending the previous 30 minutes on the divided 
attention task. However, the likelihood of this salience is questionable. The divided and 
selective attention tasks are highly similar in that they employ the same stimuli for both 
the central and peripheral target and require participants to respond in the same way on 
both tasks. Additionally, at baseline participants spent the majority of their time 
becoming familiarized and optimized on the selective attention task. The combination of 
the similarity between the two tasks and the amount of experience at baseline on the 
selective attention task would serve to reduce its novelty during the experimental session. 
 Another theory similar to the pop-out effect that explains the lack of findings is 
the effort regulation theory of mental fatigue. This theory posits that during periods of 
mental fatigue the ability to allocate resources correctly and efficiently to complete a task 
is impaired (Matthews & Desmond, 2002). A person will then either voluntarily or 
involuntarily reduce engagement in a task (van der Linden et al., 2003), especially when 
the task is perceived to be simple and require minimal attention or effort (Matthews & 
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Desmond, 2002). This means that even a mentally fatigued person has the ability to 
perform complex tasks as well as a non-fatigued person, as long as she is motivated or 
the task is complex enough to warrant a certain amount of effort (Matthews & Desmond, 
2002). It is possible that the selective attention task was sufficiently more difficult than 
the divided attention task to require the participant to engage fully in its performance. 
While it has been observed that the selective attention task may have been too simple for 
our sample, when compared with the ease of the divided attention task the contrast may 
have induced participants to engage in the task once again. By having the participants 
complete a more difficult task while mentally fatigued, they may have been forced to 
match their effort to the perceived difficulty, resulting in improved performance. 
 Future research holds the possibility of elucidating effects of alcohol and mental 
fatigue on selective attention, as well as the relationship between those two factors. Most 
importantly, a more difficult task should be used to both induce mental fatigue and to 
measure selective attention. This would accomplish two goals. The first is that a difficult 
task would be more sensitive to performance decrements by reducing or eliminating a 
floor effect. The second is that by using a more difficult task to fatigue participants, the 
possible effect of the effort regulation theory is reduced. If participants become mentally 
fatigued on a task that is just as difficult as the selective attention task, there would be no 
need to increase effort because there would not be an increase in perceived difficulty.  
 Deficits in selective attention will continue to be of concern in the future given the 
method of operation in current society. As industry further demands levels of 
performance from workers that stretch the capabilities of attentional systems, factors such 
as mental fatigue will become necessary to understand. Additionally, incidents involving 
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alcohol such as automobile accidents continue to be of concern in the United States. 
While the current research did not find deficits in selective attention as a result of mental 
fatigue or alcohol intoxication, it established a direct comparison between the practical 
impacts of mental fatigue and alcohol intoxication by placing both on the same metric. 
Future research will be able to utilize this knowledge to elucidate further the impact of 
mental fatigue and alcohol intoxication on selective attention. 
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Appendix A 
The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test 
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1. In the past year, when you drink alcohol, how many do you usually drink? 
1 or 2                     3 or 4                     5 or 6                     7 to 9                     10 or more 
  (0)                     (1)                (2)                (3)          (4) 
2. How often do you drink that amount? 
≤ Monthly                2-4 times/month               2-3 times/week                ≥ 4 times/week 
     (0)         (1)             (2)     (3) 
3. How often in the past year have you had 5 (male) / 4 (female) or more drinks on 1 
occasion? 
Never               <Monthly               Monthly                Weekly               Daily/almost daily 
   (0)         (1)    (2)        (3)        (4) 
4. How often during the past year have you found that you couldn’t stop drinking once 
you had started? 
Never               <Monthly                Monthly                Weekly               Daily/almost daily 
   (0)         (1)    (2)        (3)        (4) 
5. How often during the past year have you missed something important because of 
drinking? For example, have you ever missed school, class, or other activities?  
Never               <Monthly                Monthly                Weekly               Daily/almost daily 
   (0)         (1)    (2)        (3)        (4) 
6. How often during the past year have you needed a first drink in the morning to get 
yourself going after a heavy drinking session?  
Never               <Monthly                Monthly                Weekly               Daily/almost daily 
   (0)         (1)    (2)        (3)        (4) 
7. How often during the past year have you “felt bad” or “felt guilty” after drinking? 
43 
Never               <Monthly                Monthly                Weekly               Daily/almost daily 
   (0)         (1)    (2)        (3)        (4) 
8. How often during the past year have you been unable to remember what happened the 
night before because you had been drinking? 
Never               <Monthly                Monthly                Weekly               Daily/almost daily 
   (0)         (1)    (2)        (3)        (4) 
9. Has your drinking contributed to an injury to yourself or anyone else? 
Never                         Yes, but not in the last year                         Yes, during the last year 
   (0)           (2)            (4) 
10. Has a relative, friend, doctor, or other health worker been concerned about your 
drinking or suggested that you should cut down? 
Never                         Yes, but not in the last year                          Yes, during the last year 
   (0)           (2)            (4) 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
The Biphasic Alcohol Effects Scale 
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Please circle the number that best describes your present feelings.  
1. Difficulty concentrating 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
2. Down 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
3. Elated 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
4. Energized 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
5. Excited 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
6. Heavy head 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
7. Inactive 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
 
46 
8. Sedated 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
9. Slow thoughts 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
10. Sluggish 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
11. Stimulated 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
12. Talkative 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
13. Up 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
14. Vigorous 
    0           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9           10 
Not at all                Extremely 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
Symptoms of Fatigue Scale 
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Please circle the number that best describes your present feelings. 
 
1. Find difficulty in thinking 
 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
 
2. Become weary while talking 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
 
3. Become nervous 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
 
 
4. Unable to concentrate attention 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
  
 
5. Unable to have interest in thinking 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted 
  
 
6. Become apt to forget things 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
  
 
 
 
 
49 
7. Lack of self-confidence 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
 
 
8. Anxious about things 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
  
 
9. Unable to straighten up in posture 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
 
 
10. Lack patience 
           1              2              3              4              5              6              7              8              9 
 
Feeling fit, rested                         Feeling extremely 
                   tired, exhausted  
 
 
 
 
 
 
